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judicial means of control can be ensured in reality and what the case law of the CJEU can 
teach about the accountability standards of a structurally independent executive body 
such as the ECB. In the inverse, it also looks at the more general lessons the CJEU’s 
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law.  
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A Introduction 
 
The question whether and how to control central banks has been asked since the 
establishment of the first central banks. The introduction of the notion of independence 
of a central bank, either enshrined by legislative act, or, as in the EU, in constitutional 
terms in a series of Treaty provisions, has heightened the relevance of this question. 
What does structural independence of an executive body such as the ECB mean when it 
comes to responsibility towards political and judicial means of control? What are the 
criteria, if any, to hold the ECB to account? 
 
These questions arise also in the context of the developing European Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU). The disputes about the institutional and structural possibilities 
have long reached the CJEU as ultimate arbiter of such problematic issues in cases such 
as Pringle1 and Gauweiler.2 Whilst Pringle tested the possibilities of institutional architecture 
and the relation between inter-governmental action amongst (a great majority but not all 
of the) Member States, Gauweiler aimed straight at the powers of the ECB in the context 
of the uneven twins of economic and monetary Union. Gauweiler was the first ever 
preliminary reference procedure initiated by the German Constitutional Court (GCC), 
the Bundesverfassungsgericht.3 In it the GCC challenged the legality of the decision of 
the Governing Board of the European Central Bank (ECB) of September 2012 on so 
called ‘Outright Monetary Transactions’ (OMT).4 The GCC complied with the CJEU’s 
ruling in Gauweiler, but not without making known its disapproval of the outcome of the 
case.5   
 
Following the 2016 judgement of the GCC in Gauweiler, in 2017 a series of plaintiffs 
brought another case before the GCC regarding the legality (this time) of an actually 
                               
1 Case C-370/12 Pringle EU:C:2012:756. 
2 Case C-62/14 Gauweiler and Others v Deutscher Bundestag (OMT) of 16 June 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:400.  
3 Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Germany) lodged on 10 February 2014 – Peter 
Gauweiler and Others, GCC, 2 BvR 1390/12 of 17.12.2013, 
http://www.GCC.de/entscheidungen/rs20131217_2bvr139012.html. 
4 Gauweiler was significant for legal integration in the EU since, although this case is the first which the German GCC has 
ever referred to the CJEU in a preliminary reference procedure (Article 267 TFEU), the reference by the GCC was 
formulated in very terse words. Essentially, the reference asked for clarification about the legality of the ECB’s OMT 
decision. This was not formulated in terms of a dialogue between Courts, each respecting the other’s distinctive 
powers but instead the GCC explained to the CJEU why it considered the ECB’s decision to be ultra vires of its 
mandate. Inherent was a thinly veiled threat to not accept the exclusive competence of the CJEU to review the legality 
of EU law and, instead, to unilaterally hold an act of an EU institution to be invalid within a Member State of the EU. 
Therein, The GCC reinforced its sceptical position of the primacy of EU law over the law of Member States by 
recalling in its decision for preliminary reference its case-law concerning the limits it perceived to be set for the Federal 
Republic of Germany’s integration in the European Union. In its decision, it refers to and further interprets the scope 
of its own case-law making reference inter alia to its judgments concerning the Treaty of Maastricht (GCCE, 89, 155 
of 12 October 1993)  the Treaty of Lisbon (GCCE, 123, 267 of 30 June 2009) and in Honeywell (2 BvR 2661/06 of 
6 July 2010) as precedent for its questions to the CJEU. 
5 GCC 2 BvR 2728/13, 2 BvE 13/13, 2 BvR 2731/13, 2 BvR 2730/13, 2 BvR 2729/13, of 21 June 2016. 
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implemented programme of the ECB, the so called ‘Public Sector Purchase Programme’ 
(PSPP) which is the main component of the ECB’s framework programme called the 
‘Expanded Asset Purchase Programme’ (EAPP). The extent of these programmes is not 
entirely clear since exact numbers are hard to come by. According to figures cited by the 
GCC, the EAPP has, since its instigation, had a volume between 60 and 80 billion Euros 
a month and an overall volume of 1,8 trillion Euros by May 2017. Of these 1,8 trillion, 
1,5 trillion Euros was due to purchases under the PSPP. The GCC has presented to the 
CJEU questions as to the compatibility of these programmes with the prohibition of 
monetary financing of States under Article 123 TFEU, the principle of limited 
attribution of competencies in Article 5(1) TEU and Articles 119, 127et seq TFEU. The 
new case is known as Weiss and Others. 6 
 
Against that background, this paper looks at what the case law so far can tell us about 
the accountability standards of the ECB. This paper will thus be based on an analysis of 
the Gauweiler case with a keen eye on the possible outcome of the new case Weiss and 
Others. 7 It will look predominantly at ex post accountability through judicial review, 
which although obviously not being the only form of accountability, in the case of a 
body as constitutionally independent as the ECB, appears to be one of the more 
important forms of accountability. Therefore, this contribution to the debate on the 
developing EMU focusses on the question what general lessons the Gauweiler case has 
taught for the development of the understanding of an economic and monetary Union – 
and with it possibly EU public law more generally.  
 
B Background – the EMU and the OMT disputes 
 
One of the European Union’s most ambitious policy projects to date is the “economic 
and monetary union whose currency is the euro” (EMU, Article 3(4) TEU). The EMU’s 
two policies – the economic union and the monetary union - are an unequal set of twins. 
On one hand, the monetary union’s central elements are developed in great detail in the 
Treaties. They provide not only for provisions containing the introduction of the Euro 
as a single currency; but also institutionally, for the creation of the European System of 
Central Banks (ESCB) with the European Central Bank (ECB) on the EU level as a 
highly independent body equipped with the power to adopt specific forms of act. 
Additionally, the Treaty is specific about policy goals and principles of monetary policy.  
 
                               
6 The new case is registered as C-493/17 Weiss and Others. So far, the Court has made an order in the case rejecting the 
application of the expedited procedure under Article 105 of the Procedural Rules of the CJEU – Order of the 
President in C-493/17 Weiss and Others ECLI:EU:2017:792. 
7 C-493/17 Weiss and Others (pending at time of writing of this WP). 
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The economic union, on the other hand, is much less developed on the Union level. The 
original approach in the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992 was to leave economic – and fiscal 
- policies largely within the competence of the Member States with the establishment of 
only loose mechanisms of intergovernmental cooperation. Market pressures, so the 
original thinking behind the loose structure, would in the long run ensure that national 
policy choices by the elected parliaments and governments on the Member State levels 
and align them with each other to form a coherent whole.8 
 
In view of this situation, a key challenge for a unified monetary policy in the EU has 
been the resulting potential mismatches of policy approaches in these two highly 
interrelated policy fields.9 Irrespective of the very different treatment of the monetary 
and economic policies in the EMU, the two are highly inter-related. Monetary policy, 
largely set by the ECB and implemented by the ESCB, takes place alongside of and in 
coordination with fiscal policy measures, which typically include taxation or debt-
financing of public budgets and the allocation of available funds in national budgets and 
social security systems. The broader economic policy orientation of Member States also 
includes issues of regulation, for example, through labour law, competition law or energy 
law. Monetary policy is created by reacting to and commenting on economic policy 
decisions of Member States. Therefore, the ECB, as a highly specialised European 
institution, may risk overstepping into matters of economic policy. Drawing the 
boundaries is not easy. In exercising its task of designing the correct monetary policy for 
the Eurozone, the ECB cannot ignore the structure and the state of the economy. In 
fact, it might have more information about the reality of the economic situation than 
many Member State governments.  
 
The contested OMT decision of the ECB which gave rise to the Gauweiler case was taken 
in a time of particular market unrest. Doubts about the future of the EMU were 
rampant. The cost of borrowing money on the markets rose sharply for some Member 
                               
8 One possible explanation for the distinction between the monetary and the economic policy in the Treaties is that it had 
originally been based on the assumption that the key to stable growth in the economy was ‘sound’ monetary policy 
conducted by technical experts in independent central banks (see e.g. Peter A. Hall, The Mythology of European 
Monetary Union, 18 Swiss Political Science Review (2012), 508-513 at 508). Active fiscal policy, was deemed 
counterproductive and it would have appeared inopportune to give the monetary union capacities for coordinating its 
member states’ fiscal policies (see e.g. Tal Sadeh, Amy Verdun, Explaining Europe’s Monetary Union: A Survey of the 
Literature, 11 International Studies Review (2009), 277-301 at 285 with further references). The fact that this distinction 
allowed for the creation of a monetary union without the necessity of the transfer of a wide range of fiscal and general 
economic policy powers to the EU might help explain the striking differences in structure between the monetary and 
the economic union within the EMU. 
9 The objectives and administrative tasks of the economic and monetary union (Article 3(4) TEU) are outlined in Article 119 
TFEU according to which the activities of the Member States and the Union under monetary policy include “the 
adoption of an economic policy which is based on the close coordination of Member States' economic policies, on the 
internal market and on the definition of common objectives, and conducted in accordance with the principle of an 
open market economy with free competition” and creating and administering “a single currency, the euro, and the 
definition and conduct of a single monetary policy and exchange-rate policy (…).” 
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States of the EU, in some instances, arguably, rather independently of the underlying 
creditworthiness of the public treasuries trying to sell its government bonds. At that 
time, the president of the ECB, Mario Draghi, made a widely cited speech stating that 
within its mandate, “the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro.” To 
this he added: “And believe me, it will be enough.” 10  One month later, at a press 
conference after a meeting of the ECB’s Governing Council of 6 September 2012, the 
president of the ECB announced to the public the decision to conduct the OMT-
programme and gave some details. Essentially the ECB announced that it would develop 
a programme the legal details were yet to be decided by legal instruments. In its 
statement, the ECB declared that it was ready to purchase on secondary markets 
government bonds issued by States of the euro area, subject to certain conditions which 
included that, first, states concerned had to be subject to financial assistance by either 
the European Financial Stability Facility (“EFSF”) 11  or the European Stability 
Mechanism (“ESM”),12 two structures put into place by Member States in the context of 
the European economic policy to stabilise States in financial difficulties. Second, no 
quantitative limits for the amount of purchases of these government bonds were 
announced. Third, the ECB would act in the same way as any private creditors and 
therefore not benefit from a special status as public actor. Finally, the ECB announced 
that any liquidity so created would be fully ‘sterilised’, indicating that the ECB wished to 
avoid the creation of additional money in circulation. 
 
This announcement sufficed to reduce the in view of the ECB extreme spreads and the 
high volatility of the interest rates charged for government bonds of various States using 
the Euro which had not been based on macroeconomic differences between the States 
but were based on speculation as to the breaking up of the Eurozone. Initially, the  
announcement was not followed up by binding ECB legal instruments or decisions to 
put the OMT programme in place and was consequently never implemented. The mere 
announcement had however the power to calm the markets. Since 2012 there have been 
no more extreme spreads of the kind which led the ECB to make its announcement. 
 
The ECB did however, formally unrelated to the actual OMT programme, begin in 
March 2015 a landmark €60 billion per month so called ‘quantitative easing’ programme 
in which it buys government bonds on the secondary markets. This programme, now 
known as the EAPP and the PSPP gave rise to the pending case Weiss and Others. 
                               
10 Speech by Mario Draghi, President of the ECB at the Global Investment Conference in London, 26 July 2012, 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120726.en.html. 
11 The European Financial Stability Facility, is a special purpose vehicle, outside the EU Law framework, established as a 
private company under Luxembourg law with the EU member states as shareholders. 
12 The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) is the permanent crisis resolution mechanism for the countries of the euro 
area. The intergovernmental treaty under public international law establishing the ESM was adopted on 2 February 
2012. 
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In Gauweiler and in Weiss and Others the GCC asked essentially similar questions: whether 
the ECB overstepped its powers which have been conferred on it in the Treaties relating 
primarily to monetary policy. Did the ECB act ultra vires in venturing into economic 
policy – a matter reserved in the EU’s federal structure to the Member States?13  
 
The GCC’s references to the CJEU for preliminary ruling raised the questions, first, 
whether the OMT programme, rather than being a monetary policy measure under 
Article 18 ESCB Statute and Article 119 TFEU, was in fact related to economic policy - 
which would make it fall outside the scope of the ECB’s mandate. Secondly, the 
German court was doubtful whether the measure complied with the prohibition of 
monetary financing of the Member States laid down in the provisions of the EU 
economic union in Article 123 TFEU.  
 
This is a familiar pattern to public law: Constitutional questions arise from matters with 
an administrative background. However, the underlying concern in the German debate 
voiced also by some of the plaintiffs in the original dispute before the GCC was that if 
the ECB were to move ahead with its bond-buying programme, this might risk exposing 
the ECB to such degree of obligations that ECB risked itself to go bankrupt. In this 
case, the Member States, being the ultimate shareholders of the ECB, would be held 
liable for the losses which in turn would affect the budgetary powers of the national 
parliaments.  
 
Already here, there is good reason to doubt the soundness of the legal analysis of the 
question: Whether the ECB as a central bank with the exclusive power to issue currency 
(Article 128 TFEU) and conduct monetary policy measures can technically go bankrupt, 
is an open question. Technically speaking, one might assume that the worst case scenario 
would that an overload of the ECB with bad debt might be is that the ECB might not 
create any profits to be dispensed amongst its shareholders, the national central banks. A 
country like Germany would thus not receive any payments towards its national budget. 
Therefore the perceived risk for the budgetary autonomy of the German federal 
parliament, the Bundestag under Article 79(3) of the German Consitution, the 
Grundgesetz, and the right to meaningfully influence policy making by exercising the 
right to vote under Article 39 of the Grundgesetz, appears to be highly theoretical, if 
non-existent.  
 
                               
13 Additionally, the GCC asks the question, whether the OMT decision, by allowing for the purchase of particular Euro 
member government bonds on the so called secondary market violates the prohibition of monetary financing of state 
debt laid down in Article 123(1) TFEU. 
HOFMANN - WORKING PAPER  
 
page 7 
C Constitutional review of announcements and general programmes 
 
Irrespective of the first considerations on whether the concerns are well founded, the 
facts underlying the case in Gauweiler are important, especially when compared to the 
now pending case Weiss and Others. Gauweiler was based on the fact that the plaintiffs 
brought action before the GCC regarding an announcement made by the ECB of a 
detailed plan to undertake future market interventions by means of entering into 
purchase agreements on the open markets of government bonds.14 Legally speaking, an 
obvious question is whether such announcement, or the underlying decision to make 
such de facto announcement, can or should be subject to any judicial review. Does the 
fact that a measure was announced as an emergency measure by the ECB but later not 
implemented have change anything in this respect? 
 
a) Review of Regulation by Information by the ECB 
The possible judicial review of an announcement of a future policy as was done in 
Gaweiler is surely a very rare situation which was brought upon the CJEU by the GCC’s 
extremely wide interpretation of standing to bring action against an alleged violation of a 
fundamental rights and principles. However, within the EMU, it would appear quite 
normal that many of the measures adopted by the ECB and the ESCB are in fact not 
‘final acts’ in the sense of the extensive case law on reviewable acts under Article 263 
TFEU, but instead measures which are less specifically defined such as communications 
intended to influence the markets, purchase programmes which have certain effects 
whether intended or not and many other forms of informal action. The situation which 
the GCC’s preliminary reference in Gauweiler has given rise to is therefore possibly 
indicative of a series of questions with respect to difficulties holding action by a body 
like the highly independent ECB which is active in various way shaping monetary policy 
and which has a high degree of discretion doing so. The notion of what might be called 
‘factual conduct’ and its review is thus gaining importance in this respect. 
   
Generally, administrative action that is explicitly or implicitly designed to have factual, as 
opposed to legal, consequences or effects can be referred to as ‘factual conduct’ or 
‘factual act’ in order to distinguish them from formal, legally effective measures. 15 
Neither in the EU context nor in the context of national legal systems does factual 
conduct occur in a legal vacuum. Rules and principles of EU administrative law frame 
establishing both criteria for the legality cases of factual conduct and the consequences 
                               
14 This announcement was made in a dramatic moment with great market unrest. The ECB used its status and credibility to 
declare an emergency measure to be imminent. 
15  Expressions found in the language of some of the legal systems of the Member State include acte juridique and fait 
materiel (French) and Realakt and schlichtes/informales Verwaltungshandeln (German). 
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of the illegality. Normally the legality of any factual act undertaken by an EU institution 
would be open to review within the procedure for a preliminary ruling by the ECJ under 
Article 267 TFEU.16 That was the case in the GCC reference to the CJEU in Gauweiler. 
Unusual, but inherent in the system of legal review of the Court system in Europe which 
is separated by national and European levels, is that a national Court such as the 
German Constitutional Court, can by broadly interpreting its admissibility criteria 
achieve broad review by the CJEU of diverse categories of action of EU institutions and 
bodies. The CJEU principles has the obligation of answering questions submitted to it 
by a national court. It is recognised in EU law that a purely factual measure or other 
factual conduct, lacking in itself formal legal status or character, may amount to the 
implementation, at least implicitly or tacitly, of a decision.  
 
In Gauweiler, however, the assessment of the nature of the act was not obvious. The 
ECB held a press conference announcing a decision by its Governing Board. That 
decision was a principled decision that the ECB was ready to take, at an unknown 
moment in the future, possibly binding legal acts which were to then determine to 
greater detail the specific circumstances of possible future action. Irrespective of the 
future nature of the measure, it was undisputed that the announcement was already fairly 
detailed as to the conditions the Governing Board of the ECB had set as criteria for 
future action. Yet, legally speaking, the only ‘act’ subject to possible review was the 
announcement in the press that the Governing Board had decided in principle on how 
to address matters in the future.  
 
Information policy being reviewed under conditions of factual conduct is not limited to 
monetary policy. Monetary policy is merely one example of public communication 
having become a key tool of regulation. ‘Regulation by information’ as it is generally 
known is a central element of public activities used in many policy areas. Within the EU, 
the European Commission applies this approach to further the goals of the Treaties. 
Publication within fields of Union competences can be either in the form of information 
of interested parties about decision-making criteria and practices or in the form of 
establishing performance benchmarks and reporting about Member States’ or other 
actors’ performance. In the context of monetary policy, the ECB, as European agency, 
has the explicit legal obligation to communicate widely and transparently. 
Communication is one of the respected tools of this field by which the ECB can 
influence markets in order to conduct its policies.  
 
                               
16  The latter, unlike Art. 230 EC (Art. 263 TFEU), allows for the review of any forms of acts by the institutions. Unlike 
Art. 230 EC (Art. 263 TFEU), does not require that acts intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties.  
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All of this cannot, however, deter from the fact that the ECB announcement was not a 
binding legal decision but can merely be qualified as what was referred to as mere factual 
conduct. In reviewing this, the CJEU confirmed in Gauweiler the criteria of legality it had 
in earlier case law established for such factual conduct.  
 
These criteria include that, first, the institution or authority will need to be competent to 
act within the policy area. Factual conduct can only be tolerated within the scope of 
empowerment undertaken under the general legal provisions of the Treaties under the 
principle of conferral. The competence must extend not only to the question of whether 
to act in a certain policy area but also how to act. An announcement as to future activity, 
or even a threat with future activity is only legal if the power to conduct such activity 
exits. In the case of the OMT the issue was thus in Gauweiler whether announcing that 
such measures would be undertaken would be legal.  
 
Second, legality of such conduct relates to the limits upon the action to be taken. 
Specifically, the institution or body undertaking the factual conduct must respect and 
meet the standards of the general principles of law which generally govern the legality of 
Union acts, such as the principles of proportionality and the protection of fundamental 
rights and others.17 In other words, the test of legality of factual conduct should not 
differ from that applicable to formal measures taken by the administration.  
 
In Gauweiler the CJEU explicitly confirmed this approach as set of criteria for review of 
the announcement of the OMT programme by the ECB. It first reviews its legal basis 
and whether the ECB had acted ultra vires the powers conferred on it in its enabling law 
– the Treaties and the Statutes of the ESCB – before reviewing compliance with general 
principles of EU law such as, most importantly, the principle of proportionality.   
 
The CJEU’s confirmation in Gauweiler of the importance of regulating information and 
the confirmation of the criteria for review are an important clarification. Only due to the 
questions raised in the context of the preliminary reference from the GCC, does the 
CJEU acknowledge this approach. No direct actions for annulment under Article 263 
TFEU would have been admissible so that the Court might not have had opportunity to 
so clearly express its views on the criteria for legality and review.18  
 
 
b) Review of a general programme  
                               
17  
18 Case C-62/14 Gauweiler and Others v Deutscher Bundestag (OMT) of 16 June 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:400, paras 32-126. 
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The CJEU’s Advocate General in the case, Cruz Villalón, had pointed out another 
specificity of the review question addressed to the CJEU: The question for him is how 
to conduct judicial review ‘where the impugned act is a measure outlining a general 
programme of action, intended to bind the actual authority which is the author of the 
decision.’ The question is, therefore, should there be any difference between review of 
such general but internal programme as opposed to review of ‘an act that contains a 
measure which creates rights and obligations with regard to third parties.’  
 
The problem raised here is also indicative of difficulties holding a body such as the ECB 
to account by means of judicial review. As described above, the action in the field of 
monetary policy might be of factual nature. Moreover, measures of the ECB and of the 
ESCB are effective in monetary policy terms not necessarily because they are specific 
individual measures, but because their width and breadth can have an impact on 
worldwide currency markets and economies of the scale of the Euro zone. In Weiss and 
Others, for example, the question is posed about the legality of two ECB purchasing 
programmes worth no less than 1 800 billion Euros by May 2017 and counting. 
 
Review of a programme should take place, according to the AG,19 since general action 
programmes of public authorities may be capable of having a very direct impact on the 
future legal situation of individuals. This, so the AG “justifies taking a non-formalistic 
approach” when considering whether it should reviewed. Otherwise, the AG argued 
“there would be a risk that an institution could undermine the system of acts and 
the corresponding judicial safeguards by disguising acts that are intended to 
produce external effects as general programmes.”20  
 
The CJEU implicitly followed this line. In Gauweiler it submitted the announcement of 
the OMT programme to the same criteria for judicial review as any other factual act it 
comes to review. In fact, it can rely on a long tradition of case law doing so reaching 
back over forty years. In ERTA the CJEU reviewed a Council position paper 
coordinating Member States in the negotiations for the conclusion of an international 
agreement which was subject to judicial review, because it was capable of “derogating … 
from the procedure laid down by the Treaty.”21 There appears to be no reason, why the 
CJEU should do otherwise in Weiss and Others as well as in future case law arising on the 
review of acts of the ECB. 
 
                               
19 Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón of 14 January 2015 in Case C-62/14 Gauweiler and Others v Deutscher Bundestag (OMT), 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:400, paras 75. 76. 
20 Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón of 14 January 2015 in Case C-62/14 Gauweiler and Others v Deutscher Bundestag (OMT), 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:400, paras 75. 76. 
21 Case 22/70 ERTA, EU:C:1971:32, para 54. 
  
 
 
ADEMU WORKING PAPER SERIES 
 
 
Controlling the Powers of the ECB: 
delegation, discretion, reasoning and care 
What Gauweiler, Weiss and others can teach us 
 
Herwig C.H. Hofmann† 
 
April 2018 
WP 2018/107 
 
www.ademu-project.eu/publications/working-papers  
Abstract 
In the context of the developing European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), 
questions of political and judicial means of control of the bodies central to shaping this 
policy are of great relevance. This paper looks at how responsibility towards political and 
judicial means of control can be ensured in reality and what the case law of the CJEU can 
teach about the accountability standards of a structurally independent executive body 
such as the ECB. In the inverse, it also looks at the more general lessons the CJEU’s 
Gauweiler case has for today’s understanding of the EMU as central part of EU public 
law.  
 
Keywords: Accountability of ECB; Judicial review; Gauweiler judgment; Weiss case ; 
discretionary powers; proportionality 
 
 
† University of Luxembourg 
 
  
 
 
Acknowledgments 
This project is related to the research agenda of the ADEMU project, “A Dynamic Economic and 
Monetary Union". ADEMU is funded by the European Union's Horizon 2020 Program under grant 
agreement N° 649396 (ADEMU). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________ 
The ADEMU Working Paper Series is being supported by the European Commission Horizon 2020 European Union 
funding for Research & Innovation, grant agreement No 649396.  
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License Creative 
Commons Attribution 4.0 International, which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium 
provided that the original work is properly attributed. 
     
HOFMANN - WORKING PAPER  
 
page 11 
The fact that the GCC grants standing to plaintiffs not only regarding spending 
programmes which are actually put into place - such as in the context of the ‘Public 
Sector Purchase Programme’ (PSPP) which is the main component of the ECB’s 
framework programme called the ‘Expanded Asset Purchase Programme’ (EAPP) 
subject to the dispute in Weiss and Others – but also grants standing to allow individuals 
to seek review of announced plans for possible future action such as the OMT 
programme in Gauweiler, allows the CJEU to leave the exact nature of a programme 
open. Instead, in the preliminary reference procedure the CJEU can concentrate on 
matters of substance and critiera of review of whatever nature the action under review 
has.  
 
In fact the CJEU in Gauweiler regarded the ECB announcement, because of the details 
given in the press declaration about the future programme, to be sufficiently precise in 
order to be able to review its legality. It of course did so in view of the fact that Gauweiler 
was the first and long awaited preliminary reference by the GCC. But this approach of 
the CJEU is, it should be mentioned, entirely consistent with the CJEU’s approach in its 
review under Article 318(11) TFEU of future international agreements. That article 
specifically speaks of “agreements envisaged”, a term interpreted by the CJEU interprets 
broadly requesting only the subject matter of the agreement to be known.22 Even before 
negotiations have started and a specific text being presented, the specific procedure is 
admissible, according to the Court as long as it has sufficient information about the 
content and the basic structural elements of the plan for the envisaged agreement. 23 
Therefore, it would appear to be quite possible and reasonable to expect this line of 
approach to be applied by the CJEU also in the future to questions of review of 
measures of the ECB and ESCB. 
 
Another point, however, is quite clear from the GCC’s question and the CJEU’s 
response in Gauweiler. Judicial review of action of highly independent agencies such as 
the ECB, with its immense powers both legally and factually by its prerogative with 
regard to monetary policy, may have to take place as far as possible prior to its execution 
ex ante. The case Weiss and Others is an example of this. When the decision of the CJEU 
in that case will be handed to the GCC possibly in the early summer of 2018, the 
programme might have been wound down significantly by the ECB and a total of well 
over 2 trillion Euros might have been spent. Economists and political pundits will widely 
disagree about whether the programme was necessary, cost-effective or whether suitable 
alternatives might have existed to achieve the same result. But Weiss and Others will only 
                               
22 See e.g. Opinion 1/78 international agreement on natural rubber [1979] ECR 2871, paras 32-34. 
23 See e.g. Opinion 1/94  Accession by the Communities to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
[1996] ECR I-1759, paras 11-12.  
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be ex post review and any effects – positive or negative – will have made their lasting 
long-term imprint on reality.    
 
D The CJEU’s full review of compliance with the legal basis and its 
limitations 
 
The judicial review of the ECB’s announcement of the OMT programme that the CJEU 
offered in Gauweiler followed a well-developed and well-rehearsed two-tier approach of 
judicial review by the CJEU: First, to look at whether a programme has a legal basis and 
whether it violates any legal norms to which its powers are subject (see below a). Second, 
to review whether the measure complies with general principles of EU law. These 
principles include compliance with procedural requirements such as the obligation of 
justification as well as what is known as the ‘duty of care’ i.e. the full and impartial 
assessment of all relevant facts prior to decision-making (below b). This latter principle 
can also be merged in review with compliance with the principle of proportionality to 
which any act of an EU body is subject. The review under the principle of 
proportionality is the moment where the real question of the degree of review of the 
discretionary powers of a highly independent agency will be asked. One of the steps of 
proportionality is the review whether less onerous alternatives have been properly 
considered and discarded for good reason (below c).   
 
a) The legal basis of an ECB measure and its interpretation 
Review of any act of an EU body, be it legislative or administrative in nature is subject in 
principle to full review as to compliance with the legal basis. Under this legality 
requirement any measure needs a legal basis and must remain within the boundaries of 
the powers conferred by it. This is a question of review of what the Court refers to as 
‘objective criteria’ in that, in principle, it undertakes full review of the compliance of the 
ECB with these criteria. However, such full review needs to take into account the nature 
of the empowerment in EU law which is defined by the wording and the institutional 
context.  
 
i) The legal basis and the questions of delegation in matters of expertise  
 
The degree to which the EU’s legal system has regulated a matter by higher ranking law 
may vary. In fact the very nature of delegation (in a constitutional norm or a legislative 
act or otherwise) to an expert body such as the ECB indicates that a certain degree of 
freedom to assess situations and to act according to these assessments has been 
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delegated. Therefore, delegation is inherently linked to granting a margin of appreciation 
or of a certain degree of discretion.  
 
First, the question of what has been delegated touches upon the degree of openness and 
empowerment, which an act conferring powers on a body such as the ECB contains. If 
it is understood that the recipient of delegation has been granted the power to interpret 
the extent of a legal mandate then this interpretative power may amount to discretion. 
Generally the CJEU has not seen the interpretation of the terms of delegation and thus 
their concretization to contain an instance of exercise of powers which are either 
discretionary in nature. But occasionally, especially in the field of State aid, it has 
accepted that or deserve similar treatment to matters of discretion. The determination of 
what exactly the statutory prerequisites are (and what they mean) will often, nevertheless, 
require the interpretation of unclear statutory terms. Even where no discretion has been 
conferred on an administration, the content and meaning of a delegating provision may 
need to be determined by interpretation—often in light of facts, the existence of which 
must be established by the decision-maker. An example of this exists in state aid cases, 
concerning the definition of an aid under Article 107 TFEU. The European courts have 
held that the concept of aid is objective, the test being whether a state measure confers 
an advantage on one or more particular undertakings.52 Here, the Commission assesses 
situations in applying the law without enjoying a discretion, ‘save for particular 
circumstances owing to the complex nature of the State intervention in question’.53 
 
The ECB has been created as a specific body by Treaty provisions. It has been granted 
wide powers but is also regulated to a high degree by what can be referred to as ‘traité-
loi’. Therefore, in tune with the degree of detail of the legal framework of the matter, 
judicial review of such activity can be equally detailed. In that sense, the CJEU measures 
actions of the ECB against compliance with the legal framework and the objectives of 
monetary policy.  
 
Both the OMT programme subject to review in Gauweiler as well as the PSPP and the 
EAPP programmes subject to review in Weiss and Others fall under the powers granted to 
the ECB under Article 18 of the ESCB Statutes. Article 18 of the ESCB Statutes 
                               
52 Case C-83/98 P France v Ladbroke Racing and Commission [2000] ECR I-3271, para 25; Case T-296/97 Alitalia v Commission 
[2000] ECR II-3871, para 95; Case T-98/00 Linde v Commission [2002] ECR II-3961, para 40. 
53 Case T-67/94 Ladbroke Racing v Commission [1998] ECR II-1, paras 52–53; Case T-358/94 Air France v Commission [1996] 
ECR II-2109, para 71; Case C-56/93 Belgium v Commission [1996] ECR I-723, paras 10–11. These particular 
circumstances have been found by the case law, eg in areas in which the Commission, in order to determine whether 
investment by the public authorities in the capital of an undertaking, constitutes State aid within the meaning of Art 
107 TFEU, considers the so-called ‘private investor test’. See Case C-56/93 Belgium v Commission [1996] ECR I-723, 
para 10; Joined Cases T-126/96 and T-127/96 Breda Fucine Meridionali and others v Commission [1998] ECR II-3437, para 
5; T-296/97 Alitalia v Commission [2000] ECR II-3871, para 105; T-301/01, Alitalia v Commission [2008] ECR II-1753, 
para 185; T-196/04, Ryanair v Commission [2008] ECR II-3643, para 41. 
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authorises the ECB to conduct so called “open market and credit operations” which are 
activities which include entering into contracts for buying and selling as well as lending 
or borrowing “claims and marketable instruments” as well as conducting “credit 
operations with credit institutions and other market participants, with lending being 
based on adequate collateral.” But also, importantly, Article 18 of the ESCB Statutes 
requires active measures of transparency. Thereunder, the ECB is obliged to conduct an 
information policy “for the announcement of conditions under which they stand ready 
to enter into such transactions.” 
 
With this mandate, fundamentally political powers with wide policy discretion have been 
conferred on the ECB as a very independent administrative body of the Union. The 
ECB is designed as an expert body. It is set up to concentrate a maximum amount of 
expertise in matters of monetary policy. This is not unusual, since central banks all over 
the world are involved with exactly these tasks. Monetary policy is an area that requires 
great technical expertise to manage and entails large and substantive risks for the 
economic wellbeing of all citizens and for the financial positions of the Member States. 
For that reason, it is an eminently political area of law.24  
 
For this, the ECB is a body under EU law with features in part specific to it and in part 
known in other areas of EU administrative law. The independence of the ECB is 
reflected in its internal organisation which is not unlike other EU agencies. Within the 
ECB, the ECB’s Governing Council has the central tasks of formulating the monetary 
policy of the Union by adopting the guidelines and takes the decisions including under 
Article 12(1) Statutes ESCB, decisions relating to “intermediate monetary objectives, key 
interest rates and the supply of reserves in the ESCB.”25 However, unlike agencies, the 
ECB is owned by the national central banks (NCBs) of the EU Member States which 
have joined the Eurozone. The ECB conducts monetary policy for the EU in 
conjunction with the NCBs in the ESCB. 26  Therein, the ECB has powers to issue 
instruments, which although called guidelines, are binding orders to NCBs.  
 
                               
24 However there are some important differences between the ECB and the organization of other Union agencies. The 
relevant Treaty provisions regulate to great detail the internal structure and the independence of the ECB. The ESCB 
under Article 130 TFEU and the ECB according to its statutes a strictly independent. Under Article 130 TFEU 
“neither the ECB, nor a national central bank, nor any member of their decision making bodies shall seek or take 
instructions from Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, from any government of a Member State.” 
25 Under Article 283 TFEU the ECB’s Governing Council comprises the members of the executive board of the ECB and 
the Governors of the NCBs of the Eurozone states. The NCBs are thereby not represented as institutions but by 
individuals acting in their capacity as members of an ECB organ. Each member of the Governing Council has one 
vote exercised in confidential proceedings. But voting rights are not allocated on a one-Member-State-one-vote basis. 
The number of governors with voting rights is limited to 15. 
26  As of 2015 the following 18 Member States who had adopted the Euro as their currency: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Slovenia, Spain. 
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In its objective review of the exercise of whether ECB measures have a legal basis the 
CJEU has to accept that the expertise of the institution developing a measure must be 
recognised and that its scientific evaluation of a situation should be respected.  
 
In Gauweiler, the Advocate General spelt out ex post facto that the fact that the Eurozone 
did not break apart and that the conditions for conducting a single monetary policy was 
restored is sufficient in the context of this review. 27  The CJEU adopted the same 
approach as the AG in Gauweiler despite the contestations of one of the plaintiffs in the 
original dispute that that was not the case. Also, the GCC had formulated strong doubts 
as to whether this was the case in reality. 
 
A similar view may be taken by the CJEU in Weiss and Others in that the fact that the 
programmes of the ECB, as expensive as they might have been, did lead to or at least 
were not incompatible with maintaining price stability and the unity of the Euro shows 
that they were supportive of a more general economic policy goal of achieving economic 
recovery and growth. And who could blame the Court for taking such ex post view? It 
would be difficult to find any reliable expertise explaining how and in which parts and 
with which mechanisms the massive influx of money has stabilised the monetary 
systems without leading to massive inflation as was feared by some observers measuring 
the approach by historic standards. The success of the ECB’s measure would indicate 
that the ECB’s approach using tools of monetary policy and thereby, inter alia servicing 
economic policy objectives, as is explicitly its mandate under Article 127 TFEU was 
right. These constellations from Gauweiler and Weiss and Others however will not always 
exist in the future. 
 
It would appear therefore that, in principle, a much clearer relation between criteria of 
full review, scientific expertise and discretion in its evaluation would need to be 
established in order to ensure a more convincing level or review.  
 
ii) The centre of gravity of a measure – what about secondary effects? 
One approach is looking at the intention of the author of a measure: The delimitation of 
monetary policy – conferred on the ESCB – and economic policy – which remains 
largely with the Member States and the Union legislator – was viewed by the CJEU in 
Gauweiler as a question of primary versus secondary effects of a measure. In reality, the 
distinction mirrors older case law of the CJEU on the so called ‘centre of gravity’ rule 
which was applied in situations where a measure could have several competing legal 
basis each proposing a different decision making procedure. The Court informs that the 
                               
27 Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón of 14 January 2015 in Case C-62/14 Gauweiler and Others v Deutscher Bundestag (OMT), 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:400, para 84. 
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fact that a measure in the field of the Union’s monetary policy might incidentally also 
have secondary effects ‘on the stability of the euro area’, which is a matter of economic 
policy, does not call that assessment into question.’28 
 
Applying this centre of gravity rule is of course not easy in the context of the EMU. 
Although the ECB’s mandate is quite precisely defined in the TFEU, which in its Article 
127 states that its “the primary objective” “is to maintain price stability” (emphasis added), 
Article 127 TFEU explicitly also states that without prejudice to this objective, monetary 
policy shall support the “general economic policies in the Union... .” This is a 
restatement of Article 119(2) TFEU which identifies the broad policy objectives to be 
pursued within the EMU as having the “primary objective to maintain price stability and, 
without prejudice to this objective, to support the general economic policies in the 
Union …”. Article 282(4) TFEU establishes in this respect that the ECB “shall adopt 
such measures as are necessary to carry out its tasks.”  
 
However, the contrast between monetary and economic policy within the EMU is 
striking and is therefore the source of conflict between Member States and the ECB as 
to the division of competencies. Despite the very detailed delegation of powers in 
monetary matters to the ESCB and the ECB, only very little primary law exists regarding 
economic policy which remains within national competence subject to coordination.29  
 
Both the disputes in Gauweiler and in Weiss and Others, in essence, question the key norm 
to the dispute which is the essential limitation of ECB monetary policies regarding the 
economic policy decisions. In it, the competences of the ECB are strictly circumscribed 
by the prohibition of monetary financing of Member State debt by means of direct 
purchases as opposed to open market operations of the ECB involving Member State 
bonds (Article 123(1) TFEU). The question raised in both cases is whether the intended 
or unintended side-effects of a measure adopted by the ECB as a monetary policy 
instrument could lead to the fact that they are ultra vires regarding economic policy 
prerogatives of the Member States. 
 
                               
28 Case C-62/14 Gauweiler and Others v Deutscher Bundestag (OMT) of 16 June 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:400, para 51, with 
reference to C-370/12 Pringle EU:C:2012:756, para 56. 
29 At the time of the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, only few provisions of secondary law had been in place in the 
field of the economic policy part of the EMU. In fact, the Treaty of Lisbon reflected quite precisely the situation the 
Treaty of Maastricht had left behind with an imbalance between detailed rules on the monetary Union and very few 
precise provisions on the economic Union. Much of the field of economic policy cooperation was developed ad hoc in 
response to the onset of the 2008-2013 economic crises. The central legal norm has been Article 126 TFEU on the 
prohibition of excessive government deficits. However, these basic provisions have been expanded with structures, 
some of which seemed to be testing notions of constitutionality via the creative use of existing forms of act. Great 
creativity was employed to set up structures capable of achieving the objectives amid a divided Union with countries 
having adopted the Euro and countries not having done so. 
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In Gauweiler the Court held that the ECB had the right to design a programme to ensure 
that its monetary policy would be capable of contributing to price stability in a single 
currency area. It accepts the technical evaluations of the ECB that at the moment of the 
publication of its announcement, interest rates charged for government bonds by 
different member states had been distorted by speculation about their exit from the 
Eurozone, and therefore threatening the policy objective of a ‘single’ currency. The 
CJEU also allows the ECB to develop or to adopt concepts of economic theory and 
apply them in the context of its executive policies. In Gauweiler this was the theory the 
existence and functioning of a so called ‘transmission mechanism’ of monetary policy. 30 
The Court thereby followed its case law approach which it has developed e.g. with 
respect to the Commission’s adoption of economic theory approaches in the application 
of competition law. 
 
 iii) Conditionality  
The matter of conditionality of ECB action was subject to review in Gauweiler in the 
context of the compliance with the legal basis. It could also have been an issue of 
proportionality. 31  The ECB had announced its OMT bond buying activities on the 
condition that the ‘target’ countries, i.e. those whose bonds would be accepted,  needed 
to comply with the conditions of EFSM and ESM macroeconomic adjustment 
programmes in order to be eligible. The background to this conditionality requirement was 
the following: In reaction to the realities of the lack of common economic policy and in 
the wake of the economic crises since 2008, the EU had to find ways to deal with 
various emergency situations. Thus between late 2010 and 2012, a comprehensive 
reinforcement of economic governance in the EU and the euro area was set in place 
establishing institutional structures such as the European Stability Mechanism (ESM),32 
the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM)33 and the European Financial 
Stability Facility (EFSF) 34  as agreements under public international law outside the 
Treaty framework.35 Using public international law was not uncontested but had become 
necessary by the lack of unanimity in Council. In Pringle the CJEU declared this 
                               
30 Case C-62/14 Gauweiler and Others v Deutscher Bundestag (OMT) of 16 June 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:400, paras 46-49: “Since 
disruption of the transmission mechanism undermines the effectiveness of the measures adopted by the ESCB, that 
necessarily affects the ESCB’s ability to guarantee price stability. Accordingly, measures that are intended to preserve 
that transmission mechanism may be regarded as pertaining the primary objective laid down in Article 127(1) TFEU.” 
31 See on conditionality especially Viorica Vita, Revisiting the Dominant Discourse on Conditionality in the EU: The Case 
of  EU Spending Conditionality, 2017 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, 1-28. 
32 The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) is the permanent crisis resolution mechanism for the countries of the euro 
area. The intergovernmental treaty establishing the ESM was adopted on 2 February 2012. 
33 The European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism, legally based in Art. 122 (2) TFEU, is a programme whose purpose is to 
provide loans to EU Member States in financial difficulty. 
34 The European Financial Stability Facility, is a special purpose vehicle, outside the EU Law framework, established as a 
private company under Luxembourg law with the Member States as shareholders. 
35 See e.g. Viorica Vita, Rivisiting the Dominant Discourse on Conditionality in the EU: The Case of EU Spending 
Conditionality. 2017 Cambridge Yearbook on European Legal Studies, 1-28. 
HOFMANN - WORKING PAPER  
 
page 18 
approach legal,36 but the negative consequence is that the inter-governmental approach 
excludes making use of democratic accountability existing within rule-making 
procedures under Union law.37  
 
Although the importation of rules and standards formulated under public international 
law is a normal undertaking in EU administrative law (in some policy fields such as 
medical safety or air safety, this is explicitly encouraged by legislative acts), the ECB used 
the criteria of conditionality in effect to discriminate between EU Member States by 
buying bonds only from some but not all Eurozone Members.  
 
This the CJEU found proved the independence of the ECB and its compliance with 
primarily monetary objectives. It was, according the Court, in compliance with the 
ECB’s obligations under Article 127(1) TFEU to do nothing that would dis-encourage 
Member States to maintain sound finances. 38 In that sense, it is a question of such 
discretionary decision to include conditionality was to be seen as a justification of 
discrimination? Most likely the Court simply did not want to interfere with basic 
economic policy choices by the institutions. A more detailed review of conditionality, 
the terms under which it is created and the use of this concept should have been 
necessary in my view.   
 
But there is another problem in the conditionality issue. As the AG had pointed out, the 
ECB had participated in the formulation of conditions of conditionality. Therefore it 
had participated in that way in the formulation of the criteria of economic policy of the 
Member States which are in assistance programmes of the EFSM and the ESM. The 
ECB would thus, when creating the condition for government bond purchase 
programmes, in effect, reinforce the incentives to comply with these conditions.39 In that 
sense, the Court should have acknowledged the problematic matter of the ECB having 
participated in the conditionality criteria. When using these very criteria in the design of 
                               
36 Case C-370/12 Pringle EU:C:2012:756; with much literature having discussed the legality of the structure. See e.g. See for 
instance, Mathias Ruffert, ‘The European Debt Crisis and European Union Law’ (2011) 48 C.M.L. Rev. 1777,1785; 
Richard Palmstorfer, ‘To bail out or not to bail out? The current framework of financial assistance for euro area 
Member States measured against the requirements of EU primary law’ (2012) 37 E.L. Rev., 771-784;  Jean-Victor 
Louis, ‘The no-bailout clause and rescue packages’ (2010) 47 C.M.L.Rev. 971, 977; Jörn Pipkorn, ‘Legal arrangements 
in the Treaty of Maastricht for the effectiveness of the economic and monetary union’ (1994) 31 C.M.L.Rev. 275; 
Harald Hofmeister ‘To Bail Out Or Not to Bail Out?—Legal Aspects of the Greek Crisis’, (2010-2011) 13 Cambridge 
Yearbook of European Legal Studies, 113 – 134. 
37 The chosen approach thus considerably strengthened the executive branch of powers of the Member States. One example 
is the creation and empowerment in matters of fiscal and economic policies of the ‘Eurogroup’, a gathering of national 
ministers of finance. Another effect of this approach is that the ECB was involved, due to its unmatched expertise in 
monetary policy matters, in the drafting of the conditions of the assistance granted to Member States by the EFSM 
and the ESM. 
38 Case C-62/14 Gauweiler and Others v Deutscher Bundestag (OMT) of 16 June 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:400, paras 58-60. 
39 Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón of 14 January 2015 in Case C-62/14 Gauweiler and Others v Deutscher Bundestag (OMT), 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:400, para 156. 
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its monetary policy tools, it thereby might be seen to be more than merely incidentally 
affecting economic policy approaches but instead actively being pursuing economic 
policy goals. 
 
At the end of the day, the main problem is one of a lack of procedural rules and 
transparency in the creation of executive rule-making. Only properly formulated and 
transparently executed executive rule-making can avoid the ambiguity of the authorship 
and of expertise used in rule-making. In Gauweiler the Court avoided the problem by not 
mentioning it. But the problem is essentially here, and it was argued in the case.   
 
b) Does the ECB comply with the limitations of its mandate? 
As indicated, the scope of the ECB’s powers in monetary policy matters is particularly 
narrowly defined in EU constitutional provisions of the Treaties. The competences of 
the ECB are for example circumscribed by the prohibition of monetary financing of 
Member State debt by means of direct purchases (as opposed to open market operations 
of the ECB involving Member State bonds - Article 123(1) TFEU). This prohibition 
relates to the original concept of creating the European economic and monetary union 
by means of a centralised monetary policy in combination with a loose cooperation of 
economic policies. The original pre-crises construct was hoping for the disciplining 
effect of the financial markets to incite Member States to take sound financial decisions 
This was supposed to imply a ‘competitive’ and ‘decentralized’ model of the macro-
economic European Constitution.40 Such a ‘market-based system’ is premised on the 
fact that states’ in principle should have direct access to financial markets in order to 
finance their debts. Fiscal indiscipline and unsound public finances would be punished, 
the market-based model argues, directly through the markets which would stop the 
lending to the non-compliant state. In this vein, 125 TFEU41 establishes a ‘no bail-out 
clause’ in combination with a strict prohibition on ‘monetising’ debt through the ECB in 
Article 123 TFEU.42  
 
                               
40 Miguel Poiares Maduro, We the Court, (Hart Publishing 1998), p. 103 et seq. 
41 Article 125 (1) TFEU reads as: “The Union shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, 
regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of any Member 
State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project. A Member State 
shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, 
other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of another Member State, without prejudice to mutual 
financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project”. 
42 Article 125 (1) TFEU reads as: “The Union shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, 
regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of any Member 
State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project. A Member State 
shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, 
other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of another Member State, without prejudice to mutual 
financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project”. 
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Review of compliance and compatibility of the ECB’s actions with these limits and with 
Article 123 TFEU is, given its nature as limitation of powers and compliance with the 
condition of the legal basis, in principle subject to full judicial review by the CJEU.  
 
Whilst on this basis, the CJEU in Gauweiler found that the ECB may on the financial 
markets buy and sell outright marketable instruments which include government bonds, 
in Weiss and Others, the CJEU will need to look closer. In Gauweiler the CJEU was in the 
comfortable position to review an non-executed programme which had been announced 
only in a press-briefing informing about decisional procedures within the ECB. In Weiss 
and Others, on the other hand, the CJEU is asked to review a fully-fledged programme 
which has been put into action. The GCC explicitly asks whether the conditions defined 
in theoretical terms in Gauweiler are actually complied with in the situation at stake in 
Weiss and Others in which review is sought of ongoing programmes, the EAPP and the 
PSPP which by May 2017 had grown to the size of € 1,8 trillion.  
 
The conditions of each of the EAPP was, according to the facts established by the GCC 
published in ECB press releases.43 The PSPP was introduced by a published decision of 
4 March 2015,44 and has been amended by several subsequent decisions both as to the 
scope of the programme and the conditions applied to the purchase of public bonds.45 
Both programmes have published detailed conditions about their volume and the 
conditions of purchase.  
 
Although part of the ESCB mandate is transparent communication, the irony of this is 
that, although the ECB is required to inform transparently about its activities and the 
announcement of the OMT programme fell short within this point.  
 
In Gauweiler the CJEU had to accept that the ECB could only fulfil the requirements it 
establishes, if it leaves market participants uncertain about when and how much debt it 
would buy on the secondary market and how long it would hold the government bonds 
once purchased, i.e. whether it would resell these bonds or whether it would hold them 
to maturity.  
 
In Weiss and Others, the GCC now questions the issue from two sides: It critics that the 
ECB engages de facto in monetary financing of public budgets by publically announcing 
                               
43 ECB press release of 22 January 2015 on the EAPP. 
44 Beschluss (EU) 2015/774 der Europäischen Zentralbank vom 4. März 2015 über ein Programm zum Ankauf von 
Wertpapieren des öffentlichen Sektors an den Sekundärmärkten (EZB/2015/10). 
45 E.g.: Beschluss (EU) 2016/1041 der Europäischen Zentralbank vom 22. Juni 2016 über die Notenbankfähigkeit der von 
der Hellenischen Republik begebenen oder in vollem Umfang garantierten marktfähigen Schuldtitel und zur 
Aufhebung des Beschlusses (EU) 2015/300 (ECZ/2016/18).  
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the conditions of its purchase programme, thereby allowing for states and market 
participants to precisely fine-tune their offers to the ECB. On the other hand, the GCC 
criticises that there is not sufficient reasoning as to the conditions and conditionalities of 
the programme thus making judicial review de facto impossible – a criticism leading to the 
argument that the programmes should be declared illegal by the CJEU. 
 
Additionally, the GCC restates in its preliminary reference decision to the CJEU that in 
its view, a limited interpretation of the powers of the ESCB is necessary for reasons of 
democratic legitimacy of the ESCB, a structure which has been equipped with great 
independence in Article 130 TFEU and the third and fourth sentence of Article 282(3) 
TFEU. 46  The GCC argues that given the possible effect of monetary stability on 
individual economic rights as well as the effect of the stability of public finances on the 
budgetary powers of democratically elected national parliaments, a restrictive 
interpretation of the monetary powers of the ESCB and the ECB should be adopted. 
This argument, however, appears quite contradictory. If the ECB is obliged to ensure 
monetary stability and support economic policies including the stability of public 
finances, a broad interpretation of the means available to the ESCB and the ECB could 
be just as well arguable.  
 
Therefore, although the CJEU will conduct full review of the definition of the powers of 
the ESCB and the ECB and the exercise of these powers, it is far from clear that in the 
setting of broadly defined powers which require expert input for the definition of the 
meaning of the terms of conferral and the very wide discretion granted in the choice of 
instruments will result in a high level of detailed judicial review of the ECB. 
 
Changes to this situation, if politically desired, would most likely require Treaty 
amendments. The forms of accountability in that case would most likely be heightened 
political control and influence rather than judicial review. The argument in favour of a 
highly technocratic, expert-driven and fiercely independent ECB was, in the 1990ies the 
need for an independent control of politically motivated short-termism in economic 
thinking. A trade-off is obviously necessary between various policy objectives.  
 
Another approach would be not to address the issue of powers exercised by the ESCB 
and ECB by means of constitutional amendment through Treaty change but by means 
of administrative law in the form of the establishment of transparent and reviewable 
procedural rules for executive decision-making applicable also to matters of an agency as 
powerful as the ECB. This procedural solution is one which is often pursued by the 
                               
46 BVerfGE 142, 123 (Urteil vom 21. Juni 2016, OMT) at paras 187 et seq. 
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CJEU as cure for ills in the exercise of discretionary decision-making and will thus be 
discussed in the following part on the review of discretionary decision making. 
 
E Review of the discretionary powers of the ECB 
 
It would appear that the matters of full review discussed above leave some room for 
assessment to an EU agency as the ECB. Even in full review, the CJEU has deferred to 
assessments of factual situations and expert input into the definition of the criteria in 
Treaty provisions identifying the empowerment of the ECB. 
 
In its case law, and explicitly in Gauweiler, the CJEU has so far accepted that large 
quantities of statistical information and economic expertise are needed for monetary 
policy making. The broad legal definition of the ECB’s tasks, combined with a 
constitutionally guaranteed independence of the ECB, results in very broad discretion of 
the ECB to decide upon the use of such data for monetary policy decisions. The ECB 
has, as AG Cruz Villanón observed in Gauweiler, at its disposal technical expertise and 
access to crucial information which allows it to devise monetary policies that actually 
influence economic realities. 47  This type of highly technical, very complex and 
information intensive activity is, consequently, very difficult to monitor through 
‘traditional’ legal means of a framework of powers and judicial review.  
 
However, according to the case law of the CJEU, the fewer the possibilities of judicial 
review as to the substance of the decision of the administration, the more important are 
procedural considerations as to, for example, compliance with the procedural notion of 
the duty of care (full and independent assessment of all relevant facts prior to decision-
making),48 compliance with the requirement of reasoning of a measure. This, in the case 
law of the CJEU, is generally wrapped up in an in-depth review of proportionality. 
 
The CJEU in Gauweiler confirmed and reinforced this existing trend in the EU. Broad 
discretion conferred on an institution or body will not deter from detailed review under 
proportionality criteria. The key to this development is, like in many systems, a 
proceduralisation of review criteria.  
 
a) Statement of reasons 
                               
47 See: Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón in C-62/14 Peter Gauweiler and Others v Deutscher Bundestag of 14 January 2015.  
48 See very helpfully dissecting the distinction between the procedural duty of care in the context of the principle of good 
administration and substantive criteria for care e.g. in the field of tort law or, more specifically in the ECB mandate, 
the ECB’s duty of care for the unity and integrity of the internal market: Pierre Schammo, The ECB’s duty of care for 
the unity and integrity of the internal market, 42 European Law Review (2017), 3-26 at pp. 18-19. 
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The acceptance of the technical expertise and forecasts based on complex assessments 
by the court in that context must be generally supported by an adequate statement of the 
reasons for its decision allowing the Court to conduct review under all relevant criteria 
including the principle of proportionality.  
 
In this context, in Gauweiler the fact that the OMT programme was merely announced at 
a press conference but was non-existent at the time of the CJEU’s decision, led to the 
fact that – as all factual conduct – it came without a statement of reasons. The Court 
played over this problem by stating that  
“the press release, together with draft legal acts considered during the meeting of 
the Governing Council [of the ECB] at which the press release was approved, 
make known the essential elements of a programme such as that announced in 
the press release and are as such as to enable the Court to exercise its judicial 
review.”49  
 
With respect to the programmes subject to review in Weiss and Others the relevant 
decisions state very clearly the conditions of the programmes such as their temporary 
scope, their material scope and certain conditions of purchase. This will allow for a more 
detailed review of proportionality. However, the exact terms of contract in the open 
market actions of the ESCB members (Article 18 of the ESCB Statutes) do not appear 
to be known but will be relevant. 
 
In general, however, the criticism can cut both ways, as mentioned. Too much 
transparency can lead to the fact that a measure designed as monetary intervention will 
have strong effects on economic policy making. On the other hand, too little 
transparency as to the reasons and conditions of a measure will cause difficulties in 
judicial review.  
 
b) Appropriateness 
On the basis of deference to the factual assessment of the ECB and its explanations 
given in and around the press conference leading to the announcement of the OMT 
programme, the CJEU there finds that under the first leg of the proportionality test, the 
ECB could reasonably have taken the view that the OMT programme was appropriate 
to achieve the objectives outlined in the Treaty of conducting a single currency, 
maintaining price stability in the entire Eurozone and without prejudice to the former 
also supporting the general economic policies of the Union, especially economic 
                               
49 Case C-62/14 Gauweiler and Others v Deutscher Bundestag (OMT) of 16 June 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:400, para 71. 
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recovery, growth and sound public finances.50 However, in Gauweiler this was undertaken 
in the context of an emergency measure which presumably would reduce the 
requirements of documentation and increase the margin of appreciation of facts granted 
to the institution. In Weiss and Others the programmes are more fully documented.  
 
c) Manifestly going beyond what is necessary 
The second leg of the proportionality review looks at whether the measure under review, 
the OMT programme, does not go manifestly beyond what is necessary to achieve the 
objectives it purposes. This level of review is particularly difficult in the event that it is 
not even clear at the time of judicial review if and under which exact conditions that 
measure would be ever implemented. The in-depth discussion of the CJEU of this 
question shows just how far it is willing to go to humour the GCC in order to fully 
answer the question posed even in the absence of legally binding detailed information 
about the possible future act. After all, the object of review is not a legal act but an 
announcement at a press conference of the fact that the Governing Board of the ECB 
has decided that in future it may engage in certain activities.  
 
In Gauweiler the CJEU required that the conditions discussed in the second aspect of 
proportionality here require that the bond purchases by the ECB cease as soon as the 
ECB’s objectives have been achieved. 51  However, the determination of this very 
moment is in the ECB’s discretion. This criteria is therefore not a very powerful criteria 
for limitation and judicial review. The Court also points out that at the time of 
judgement - two years after the announcement of the programme - it has not been 
implemented. The announcement as such having been effective to calm the markets 
therefore seems to have been effective and necessary to achieve the objectives of 
conducting monetary policy for the single currency, the Euro, in an ex post facto analyis. 
The Court here can use the advantage of hindsight, although the legality of a programme 
announcement as the that regarding OMT would need to be reviewed as of the moment 
of its announcement. In Weiss and Others, concerning a case of a set of de facto 
implemented programmes, review would have to take place as to the legality of the 
programme not only at the moment of its initiation, but continuously thereafter.52  
 
However, in Gauweiler, the CJEU found a different approach: It did not apply the usual 
formula for the second leg of the proportionality test in balancing decisions or 
limitations of rights. The more standard approach has been displayed, for example, in 
Afton Chemical where the Court cited a long line of precedent for its formula that “when 
                               
50 Case C-62/14 Gauweiler and Others v Deutscher Bundestag (OMT) of 16 June 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:400, paras 72-80. 
51 Case C-62/14 Gauweiler and Others v Deutscher Bundestag (OMT) of 16 June 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:400, para 82. 
52 See to this effect Schrems I  CITE FULLY. 
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there is a choice between several appropriate measures recourse must be had to the least 
onerous.” 53 The notion of ‘least onerous’ therefore requires a clear definition of the 
rights in question and of balancing.  
 
In Gauweiler the CJEU avoided this formulation. One can only speculate why. One 
possibility is that this allows to avoid discussing the claim brought forward by the GCC 
in its decision on preliminary reference that at the end of the day the budgetary rights of 
the Member States are in question. After all, the reason this might not be the case is a 
rather problematic one to make in legal terms. The ECB has the power to create money, 
and thus is most unlikely ever to go bankrupt. Possibly for this reason, the CJEU in 
Gauweiler retreated to the more general formulation used occasionally in pure ‘limitation 
of competence’ or with other words ‘conferral’ questions and cited instead Association 
Kokopelli, a case with a particularly limited reading of the criteria for review of 
proportionality, as precedent of the formulation of the criteria of proportionality in this 
case.54 Interestingly, the CJEU decided thereby actively to reduce its level of review as 
compared to the AG who in para 177 of his opinion referred to a more onerous second-
leg proportionality test by looking for whether “the means used may none the less be 
excessive if compared with the other options that would have been available to the 
ECB.”55 In its decision on presenting a preliminary question in Weiss and Others, the GCC 
comes forcefully back to this issue citing both the economic rights of individuals as well 
as the budgetary powers of the Member State parliaments.56   
 
As a result, the Court finds that since the conditions for the OMT programme include 
strict limitations to objectives pursued and is limited to certain types pf bonds issued by 
Member States selected on the basis of pre-defined criteria the measure is not manifestly 
beyond what is necessary to achieve the ECB’s monetary policy objectives. Gauweiler 
limited the proportionality review. This  might become the most problematic element of 
the case, and I would predict, would constitute its weakest point. It is a failed 
opportunity to conduct proportionality review to a degree which would even be 
convincing to the openly critical GCC. The preliminary reference in Weiss and Others 
takes up exactly this point forcefully.   
 
d) Overall reasonableness 
                               
53 CITE FULLY Afton Chemical 
54 See C-59/11 Association Kokopelli EU:C:2012:447, para 38. Kokopelli concerned a dispute between two seed dealing 
companies and the question whether seeds varieties not officially registered could be marketed. Kokopelli  must be 
considered particularly narrow since the case actually affected rights of individuals which needed to be balanced.  
55 Citing C-331/88  Fédesa and Others EU:C:1990:391 para 13 and C-180/00 Netherlands v Commission EU:C:2005:451, para 
103. 
56 Decision of the German Constitutional Court, Bundesverfassungsgericht of 24 May 2017, 2 BvR 859/15, 1651/15, 
2006/15 and 980/16, para 56. 
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The third leg of the proportionality test, finally, consists of analysing whether the various 
interests in the case have been overall reasonably weighed up against each other. On the 
basis of the above discussions both the CJEU and the AG have no difficulties finding 
that this level of review is complied with. The general question to be asked, which 
underlies the German concerns in the originating case is what level of cost the monetary 
union might be worth to them. That would appear to be a question which is quite 
unsuitable for litigation and for a court to decide. Accordingly, the discussion is short on 
this matter in Gauweiler.   
 
The same will most likely be the case in Weiss and Others. Despite the pharanoic 
dimensions of the EAPP and the PSPP which by May 2017 had reached € 1,8 trillion 
roughly the equivalent of Italy’s annual GDP (or over 10% of the EU28 annual GDP), 
the ex post review shows so far, that price stability has been maintained and the economy 
in the EU is growing and public finances in the Member States seem to have stabilized. 
Thus it is difficult to find that in judicial review a comparison between means and ends 
is a manifest imbalance would be found – despite valid intellectual debates about the 
effects and the merits of the programmes.    
 
 
F What do we learn from disputes such as Gauweiler 
and soon Weiss and Others? 
 
The legal framework of EU economic policy of the EU is in the process of continuous 
transformation. The economic and financial crisis of the years after 2008 have been 
catalytic for accelerating integration. But some of these measures have gone deeper than 
simply strengthening the previous policy framework and have changed the details of the 
EMU roadmap both from an institutional and constitutional perspective. Monetary 
policy excised in the ESCB’s specific structure of de-centralised Union administration is 
a case study of a highly integrated agency regime which no other EU policy area has 
reached. At the same time, EU monetary policy has become an exemplary field to study 
the independence of agencies, the powerful role which specific expertise is given in 
defining a highly relevant and specifically framed objective: that of guaranteeing price 
stability. This precisely defined policy goal shall be exercised where possible in the 
context of maintaining price stability to contribute to the ‘general economic policies in 
the Union’. It is thus a technical objective which should be exercised also in the context 
of politically defined goals. Therefore, the administration of the Union’s monetary policy 
is highly political administration.  
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However despite the many specific features, this area also presents itself as an area 
of study with a wealth of examples for many of the general characteristics and the 
problems of the fast evolving Union administrative law.57 One of the reasons for this 
is that normally, monetary and economic policies are quite well hidden away in the 
bowls of the state. Lawyers rarely venture into this field of high technical expertise 
and highly independent agencies. If at all, public law instruments of control of 
central banks are often centred on anticipatory modes of control through 
nomination of key personnel such as the central bank’s president. Ex post tools of 
review and accountability often are in the form of auditing reports and parliament 
hearings in which central bankers need to justify their decisions.  
 
In the EU, this generally well hidden area has been brought to the broad light of day 
by the Treaty of Maastricht and Lisbon’s distribution of powers concerning EMU 
along the various multiple levels of governance. Monetary policy was fully 
centralised in the ECB, economic policy largely remained in the hands of the 
Member States. This distinction proved to be an impossible approach and so since 
2008 in a series of international agreements and EU legislation, economic policy has 
been brought into the realm of the executive branches of Member States 
coordinating on an intergovernmental level and the EU Commission. In view of this, 
the ECB is supposed to exercise its objective of maintaining price stability whilst 
nonetheless supporting the economic policy objectives formulated in within the 
EMU. In doing so, however, it has to navigate the particular, and one might add as 
the 2008 crises has shown, quite possibly over-optimistic or even naïve, hope that 
the ‘invisible hand’ of market pressures will lead to a fully-fledged coordination of 
growth oriented economic policies of the Euro Member States. Instead, the ECB 
finds itself in a situation where it has to define monetary policy in view of markets, 
which can over- or under-price certain risks. Speculation is a strong force in creating 
prices. In that situation, the ECB had announced its OMT programme and put into 
place the EAPP and PSPP programmes. The objectives were to counteract against 
speculation detrimental to the existence of a single monetary policy, strengthen 
monetary stability and overall budgetary stability in the Member States.  
 
In view of this, at the end of the day, the disputes before the GCC arose from the 
fear that the German Parliament having the ultimate budgetary rights in Germany, 
would be exposed to undefined financial liabilities resulting from ECB action on 
bond markets trying to stem speculation and maintain the unity of the Eurozone. 
The fear was that by buying bonds, the ECB would actually risk bankruptcy itself 
and thus in need of being bailed out by its shareholders – the national central banks. 
                               
57 Herwig C.H. Hofmann, Gerard C. Rowe, Alexander H. Türk, Administrative Law and Policy of the European Union, Oxford 
University Press (Oxford 2011), 18. 
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Also, the fear was that the ECB would indirectly engage in monetary financing of 
state budgets in that it would buy government bonds by circumventing the 
prohibition of monetary financing of budgets in Article 123(2) TFEU.  
 
The disputes however also show that it is difficult to maintain a clear distinction 
between monetary and economic policy. The EMU’s structure of strict distinction is 
a shimera. It limits both the monetary as well as the economic policy options of the 
EU and the Member States. Instead of classic neo-functionalist spill-over effects, the 
ECB is left in a situation fighting against speculation-based attempts at roll-backs of 
integration and very different interpretations of good public budgetary policy.  
 
With respect to the possibilities of judicial review of the actions of central banks, 
Gauweiler marks a big step towards developing accountability in legal terms whilst 
respecting technical expertise and the discretion which has been conferred on the 
ECB in order to back that up. The key instrument in EU law to navigate the 
treacherous waters of ensuring legality and accountability of acts on one hand and 
protecting discretionary power has consisted in fine-tuning the review under 
proportionality. The CJEU takes the right steps to submit ECB action to the 
proportionality test. But much needs to be done to better develop the criteria of 
proportionality whose exact application remains in a state of flux. Just by comparing 
the precedents the CJEU and the AG rely on in definition of their proportionality 
criteria makes clear, how much work needs to be done in this context. Weiss and 
Others will be the test-case revisiting these matters. 
 
The approaches of the CJEU to review of extensive executive discretion in the field 
of monetary and economic policies in Gauweiler and Weiss and Others will become a 
central element of discussion in future structures. On December 6th 2017 the 
Commission proposed a policy plan on the deepening of the EMU. 58  Therein it 
proposes inter alia the creation of a European Monetary Fund (EMF). The EMF 
would build on the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which is an international 
organisation based in Luxembourg and integrate this into the EU law framework as 
an EMF. The EMF would thus become a kind of EU agency with a legal basis in a 
legislative act. The Commission expects that to “strengthened its institutional 
anchoring” “will help to create new synergies within the EU framework, notably in 
                               
58 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the 
Council and the European Central Bank Further Steps Towards Completing Europe’s EMU: A Roadmap of 6 
December 2017, COM(2017) 821 final; European Commission, Reflection Paper on the Deepening of the Economic 
and Monetary Union of 31.5.2017, COM(2017) 291 final. 
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terms of transparency, legal review and efficiency of the EU’s financial resources.”59 
It can also contribute to improving the cooperation with the European Commission 
as well as the latter’s oversight functions as well as accountability to the European 
Parliament.”60 The ESM would thus be an agency with far reaching freedoms and 
discretionary powers within the EMU, albeit as an agency based on legislative 
empowerment and not a constitutional mandate as the ECB. The criteria of review 
established in Gauweiler and Weiss and Others will become a new EU agency standard. 
It is noteworthy, that these developments are not limited to the field of the EMU. 
Also the new Frontex regulation goes beyond classic agency discretion powers and 
requires robust forms of judicial review to maintain its legitimacy. 
 
Another interesting point which was developed in this case, in response to the 
pressure exercised by the GCC, is the possibility of review of what generally might 
be regarded as a ‘factual act’ as opposed to a legally binding act. The announcement 
of a programme which was yet to be defined in legally binding acts was submitted to 
review to answer the question of the GCC. The definition of the degree of sub-
elements of the programme was unclear. Therefore, the Court essentially 
reconfirmed a structure of review for all such not-fully defined types of act, be they 
factual acts, be they programmes of unclear legal status to be later specified: The 
single approach to their review is to control the existence of a legal basis, the 
compliance of the measure with all specifications of the legal basis and, finally, a test 
as to the compliance of the measure with general principles of EU law, which in all 
practical terms often means essentially the compliance with the proportionality test.   
 
                               
59 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the 
Council and the European Central Bank Further Steps Towards Completing Europe’s EMU: A Roadmap of 6 
December 2017, COM(2017) 821 final, 4. 
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